Power Systems Management and Associated Information Exchange
-
Technical committeeTypeAcronymIEC 62351-9CommitteePublished year2013Description
IEC 62351-9:2017 specifies cryptographic key management, namely how to generate, distribute, revoke, and handle public-key certificates and cryptographic keys to protect digital data and its communication. Included in the scope is the handling of asymmetric keys (e.g. private keys and public-key certificates), as well as symmetric keys for groups (GDOI). This document assumes that other standards have already chosen the type of keys and cryptography that will be utilized, since the cryptography algorithms and key materials chosen will be typically mandated by an organization’s own local security policies and by the need to be compliant with other international standards. This document therefore specifies only the management techniques for these selected key and cryptography infrastructures. The objective is to define requirements and technologies to achieve interoperability of key management. The purpose of this document is to guarantee interoperability among different vendors by specifying or limiting key management options to be used. This document assumes that the reader understands cryptography and PKI principles.
-
Technical committeeTypeAcronymIEC 62351-8CommitteePublished year2011Description
IEC 62351-8: 2020 is to facilitate role-based access control (RBAC) for power system management. RBAC assigns human users, automated systems, and software applications (collectively called "subjects" in this document) to specified "roles", and restricts their access to only those resources, which the security policies identify as necessary for their roles.
As electric power systems become more automated and cyber security concerns become more prominent, it is becoming increasingly critical to ensure that access to data (read, write, control, etc.) is restricted. As in many aspects of security, RBAC is not just a technology; it is a way of running a business. RBAC is not a new concept; in fact, it is used by many operating systems to control access to system resources. Specifically, RBAC provides an alternative to the all-or-nothing super-user model in which all subjects have access to all data, including control commands.
RBAC is a primary method to meet the security principle of least privilege, which states that no subject should be authorized more permissions than necessary for performing that subject’s task. With RBAC, authorization is separated from authentication. RBAC enables an organization to subdivide super-user capabilities and package them into special user accounts termed roles for assignment to specific individuals according to their associated duties. This subdivision enables security policies to determine who or what systems are permitted access to which data in other systems. RBAC provides thus a means of reallocating system controls as defined by the organization policy. In particular, RBAC can protect sensitive system operations from inadvertent (or deliberate) actions by unauthorized users. Clearly RBAC is not confined to human users though; it applies equally well to automated systems and software applications, i.e., software parts operating independent of user interactions.
The following interactions are in scope:
– local (direct wired) access to the object by a human user; by a local and automated computer agent, or built-in HMI or panel;
– remote (via dial-up or wireless media) access to the object by a human user;
– remote (via dial-up or wireless media) access to the object by a remote automated computer agent, e.g. another object at another substation, a distributed energy resource at an end-user’s facility, or a control centre application.
While this document defines a set of mandatory roles to be supported, the exchange format for defined specific or custom roles is also in scope of this document.
Out of scope for this document are all topics which are not directly related to the definition of roles and access tokens for local and remote access, especially administrative or organizational tasks. -
Technical committeeTypeAcronymIEC 62351-7CommitteePublished year2010Description
IEC 62351-7:2017 defines network and system management (NSM) data object models that are specific to power system operations. These NSM data objects will be used to monitor the health of networks and systems, to detect possible security intrusions, and to manage the performance and reliability of the information infrastructure. The goal is to define a set of abstract objects that will allow the remote monitoring of the health and condition of IEDs (Intelligent Electronic Devices), RTUs (Remote Terminal Units), DERs (Distributed Energy Resources) systems and other systems that are important to power system operations. This new edition constitutes a technical revision and includes the following significant technical changes with respect to IEC TS 62351-7 (2010): NSM object data model reviewed and enriched; UML model adopted for NSM objects description; SNMP protocol MIBs translation included as Code Components.
The Code Components included in this IEC standard are also available as electronic machine -
Technical committeeTypeAcronymIEC 62351-6CommitteePublished year2007Description
IEC 62351-6:2020 specifies messages, procedures, and algorithms for securing the operation of all protocols based on or derived from the IEC 61850 series. This document applies to at least those protocols listed below:
IEC 61850-8-1 Communication networks and systems for power utility automation – Part 8-1: Specific communication service mapping (SCSM) – Mappings to MMS (ISO/IEC 9506-1 and ISO/IEC 9506-2) and to ISO/IEC 8802-3
IEC 61850-8-2 Communication networks and systems for power utility automation – Part 8-2: Specific communication service mapping (SCSM) – Mapping to Extensible Messaging Presence Protocol (XMPP)
IEC 61850-9-2 Communication networks and systems for power utility automation – Part 9-2: Specific communication service mapping (SCSM) – Sampled values over ISO/IEC 8802-3
IEC 61850-6 Communication networks and systems for power utility automation – Part 6: Configuration description language for communication in power utility automation systems related to IEDs
The initial audience for this document is intended to be the members of the working groups developing or making use of the protocols listed in Table 1. For the measures described in this specification to take effect, they must be accepted and referenced by the specifications for the protocols themselves. This document is written to enable that process.
The subsequent audience for this document is intended to be the developers of products that implement these protocols.
Portions of this document may also be of use to managers and executives in order to understand the purpose and requirements of the work. -
Technical committeeTypeAcronymIEC 62351-5CommitteePublished year2013Description
IEC/TS 62351-5:2013(E) specifies messages, procedures and algorithms for securing the operation of all protocols based on or derived from IEC 60870-5: Telecontrol equipment and systems - Transmission protocols. This Technical Specification applies to at least those protocols listed in IEC 60870-5-101, 5-102, 5-103, 5-104. This new edition includes the following main changes with respect to the previous edition:
- adds the capability to change Update Keys remotely;
- adds security statistics to aid in detecting attacks;
- adds measures to avoid being forced to change session keys too often;
- discards unexpected messages more often as possible attacks;
- adds to the list of permitted security algorithms;
- adds new rules for calculating challenge sequence numbers. -
Technical committeeTypeAcronymIEC 62351-4CommitteePublished year2007Description
IEC 62351:2018+A1:2020 specifies security requirements both at the transport layer and at the application layer. While IEC TS 62351-4:2007 primarily provided some limited support at the application layer for authentication during handshake for the Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) based applications, this document provides support for extended integrity and authentication both for the handshake phase and for the data transfer phase. It provides for shared key management and data transfer encryption at the application layer and it provides security end-to-end (E2E) with zero or more intermediate entities. While IEC TS 62351-4:2007 only provides support for systems based on the MMS, i.e. systems using an Open Systems Interworking (OSI) protocol stack, this document provides support for application protocols using other protocol stacks, e.g. an Internet protocol suite. This support is extended to protect application protocols using XML encoding. This extended security at the application layer is referred to as E2E-security. In addition to E2E security, this part of IEC 62351 also provides mapping to environmental protocols carrying the security related information. Only OSI and XMPP environments are currently considered. This consolidated version consists of the first edition (2018) and its amendment 1 (2020). Therefore, no need to order amendment in addition to this publication.
-
Technical committeeTypeAcronymIEC 62351-3CommitteePublished year2007Description
IEC 62351-3:2014+A1:2018+A2:2020 specifies how to provide confidentiality, integrity protection, and message level authentication for SCADA and telecontrol protocols that make use of TCP/IP as a message transport layer when cyber-security is required. Although there are many possible solutions to secure TCP/IP, the particular scope of this part is to provide security between communicating entities at either end of a TCP/IP connection within the end communicating entities. This part of IEC 62351 reflects the security requirements of the IEC power systems management protocols. This consolidated version consists of the first edition (2014), its amendment 1 (2018) and its amendment 1 (2020). Therefore, no need to order amendments in addition to this publication.
-
Technical committeeTypeAcronymIEC 62351-2CommitteePublished year2008Description
IEC 62351-2:2008 (E) covers the key terms used in the IEC 62351 series, and is not meant to be a definitive list. Most terms used for cyber security are formally defined by other standards organizations, and so are included here with references to where they were originally defined.
This publication is of core relevance for Smart Grid.
-
Technical committeeTypeAcronymIEC 62351-11CommitteePublished year2015Description
IEC 62351-11:2016 specifies schema, procedures, and algorithms for securing XML documents that are used within the scope of the IEC as well as documents in other domains. This part is intended to be referenced by standards if secure exchanges are required, unless there is an agreement between parties in order to use other recognized secure exchange mechanisms. This part of IEC 62351 utilizes well-known W3C standards for XML document security and provides profiling of these standards and additional extensions.
-
Technical committeeTypeAcronymIEC 62351-1CommitteePublished year2007Description
IEC 62351-1 provides an introduction to the remaining parts of the standard, primarily to introduce the reader to various aspects of information security as applied to power system operations.